Dao Academy

Emotion and decision-makingLesson 2 of 4

Managing a feeling

The same pounding heart can be fear or excitement. How the mind labels a feeling, why naming and reframing work better than hiding, and what to do when a low mood loops.

About 25 minutes, with 2 activities · 12 minutes of video

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The same pounding heart

Your heart is pounding, your breath is quick, your palms are damp, and your stomach is tight. Is this fear, excitement, anger, or the first moments of falling in love? The body’s signals alone do not settle it. You are standing at the edge of a stage, or opening a message from your boss, or looking across a table at someone new, and the signals are the same in each case. What differs is the story you tell about them.

In 1962 two psychologists, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, built an experiment around that idea. Male undergraduates at the University of Minnesota were told they were testing the effects of a vitamin compound, “Suproxin,” on vision, and were given an injection. For most of them it was epinephrine, the hormone also called adrenaline, which makes the heart race and the hands shake. A few received salt water. Some of the epinephrine group were told what the shot would really do; others were told nothing, and others were told to expect side effects such as numbness and itching, which were false. Then each student waited in a room with another “subject” who was really an actor. In one version the actor was cheerfully silly, shooting paper basketballs at the wastebasket, flying paper airplanes, and playing with a hula hoop. In another he grew angrier and angrier over a long, increasingly personal questionnaire and finally tore it up.

The paper reported that students who had no explanation for their racing hearts were more likely to take on the mood of the room, euphoric or angry, than those who had been told the shot would make their hearts race. The conclusion became a textbook idea, the “two-factor theory” of emotion: a bodily state of arousal plus a label supplied by the situation.

Another view

The experiment is much more famous than it is solid. The original effects were modest, the self-reports were weak, and several attempts to repeat it did not find the same pattern: Gary Marshall and Philip Zimbardo in 1979 found that the euphoric actor had little influence on subjects, and Christina Maslach, using hypnosis to create arousal with no explanation, found that her subjects reported negative states whatever the actor did. In 1983 Rainer Reisenzein reviewed twenty years of work and found no convincing evidence that unexplained arousal is a blank that the situation turns into an emotion. What survives is a weaker claim: arousal can intensify a feeling that the situation already points to, and what we think is causing our arousal matters somewhat. That is still a useful idea, as the rest of this lesson shows.

A second classic has had a similar career. In 1974 Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron stopped young men who had just crossed either a long, swaying footbridge about 230 feet (70 meters) above a river in North Vancouver, the Capilano Suspension Bridge, or a low, solid bridge over a small stream. An attractive woman interviewer asked each man to write a short story to a picture, then tore off a corner of paper, wrote her name and phone number on it, and said he was welcome to call. Nine of the 18 men from the high bridge who took a number called, against 2 of the 16 from the low bridge, and their stories had more sexual imagery. The suggestion was that the men mistook the bridge’s thrill for attraction. But the groups chose their own bridge, the cells were tiny, a version with a male interviewer showed no difference, and several later attempts to reproduce the result failed or found it only under special conditions. A 2003 study at amusement parks did find that people leaving a roller coaster rated a stranger’s photo as more attractive than people waiting in line, but only when they rode with someone other than a romantic partner. It is a good story. It is not a law.

Naming it

Even if the experiments were shaky, the idea behind them, that an emotion is partly an interpretation, is widely held. The “appraisal” tradition in psychology, associated with Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus, and Klaus Scherer, says that what you feel depends on how you size up a situation: does it matter to my goals, is it going my way, who is responsible, can I cope? The same event can therefore produce different feelings. You overhear someone discussing your work at a party. If it is your boss, you may freeze. If it is a junior colleague, you may stride over and say, “See me tomorrow.” The sound was the same.

The psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett goes further. In her “theory of constructed emotion,” the brain does not have a ready-made circuit for each emotion that fires when it is triggered. It predicts what the body’s signals mean, using concepts learned from experience and culture, and “fear” or “anger” is the category it settles on. Some evidence supports this: a 2012 meta-analysis found little sign that each emotion category maps cleanly onto its own brain region, and in 2019 a review led by Barrett concluded that people’s faces do not show emotions in the reliable, one-to-one way that popular accounts assume. Others disagree, and a large 2017 study of emotional videos found that people use about 27 categories with fuzzy edges between them. The question is open. The practical point does not depend on it: the words you have for a feeling shape what you can do with it.

That is the logic behind “affect labeling,” a finding from the laboratory of Matthew Lieberman. In a 2007 brain-imaging study of 30 people, those who put a name to the emotion on a face they were looking at (“angry” or “fearful”) showed less activity in the amygdala, and more in a region of the right prefrontal cortex, than those who only picked a first name for the same face. Later work has been more mixed. In a study of 88 people who were afraid of spiders, those who described their feelings in words while facing a spider showed a bigger drop in skin sweating a week later than those who used other strategies, but they did not report less fear. Other studies find that labeling helps about as much as distraction or rethinking, and that it can also dampen pleasant feelings. Naming a feeling is not a cure. It seems to take a little of the heat out of it, and it is free.

The lid and the lens

If feelings are partly interpreted, there are two broad ways to manage one. You can change what you do with it, or you can change what it means. The psychologist James Gross of Stanford sorted the possibilities along a timeline. Early ones change the situation. Late ones change the response. His two best-studied strategies sit at opposite ends. Suppression is a late strategy: the feeling arises and you hide its signs, keeping your face and voice still, like a lid pressed on a pot. Reappraisal is an early one: you change how you read the situation, like changing the lens on a camera, before the feeling has fully formed.

Gross and Robert Levenson tested suppression in 1993 by showing 85 people a disgusting film. Those told to hide their reactions did show less on their faces. But their felt disgust was unchanged, and measurements showed signs of more sympathetic arousal, such as more frequent blinking. A 1998 experiment with 120 people found that reappraisal worked differently: told to think about the film in a way that would make them feel less, people felt less disgust as well as showing less. Hiding a feeling, in this research, mainly hides the display.

The costs showed up elsewhere too. In experiments by Jane Richards and Gross, people who suppressed their reactions to emotional material remembered it worse afterward, as if holding the lid down used up attention. In a study by Emily Butler and colleagues, pairs of women who did not know each other discussed an upsetting topic; when one of them suppressed her emotions, the other’s blood pressure rose and they got on less well. And a 2002 brain-imaging study by Kevin Ochsner and colleagues found that when people reinterpreted upsetting photos so they felt less negative, activity rose in prefrontal regions and fell in the amygdala, consistent with the top-down control that the first lesson’s “slow road” predicts. A meta-analysis of 306 comparisons in 2012 found that reappraisal reduced negative feeling by a small-to-moderate amount, while suppression reduced expression but not experience.

Same heartbeat, three stories

Pick a situation. The body’s signals are identical in each case. Then try three ways of handling them and read what research has found about each.

Nothing is stored. The studies cited are small, mostly with students, and results vary between samples: use this as a way to see the idea, not as a prescription.

Reappraisal can take a very simple form. In a 2010 study, students preparing for the graduate-school exam known as the GRE were told that the arousal they felt under pressure can help performance. They scored higher on the math section of a practice test, and, in a follow-up one to three months later, on the real exam. In 2014 Alison Wood Brooks found that people who told themselves “I am excited,” instead of trying to calm down, did better at karaoke singing, public speaking, and a math test. These are promising studies of modest size. They are an example of reading the same racing heart as readiness instead of danger, not a proof that mindset conquers anxiety.

Another view

“Reappraisal good, suppression bad” is the average finding, and also too simple. People choose to reappraise when a feeling is mild and to distract themselves when it is intense, probably because reinterpreting a strong feeling is hard (Gal Sheppes and colleagues, 2011). In a study of 170 people, being good at reappraisal went with less depression under stress that could not be controlled, but with more depression when the stress could be controlled (Allison Troy and colleagues, 2013). George Bonanno and Charles Burton argue that no strategy is good everywhere: what protects people is flexibility, a repertoire of strategies and the sense to switch among them. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, New York students who could both exaggerate and hide their expressions on request coped better than those who could do only one.

Closer to home

“Keep calm and carry on” is now printed on mugs from London to Los Angeles. It began in 1939 as one of three posters the British Ministry of Information ordered for use in a war. Nearly 2.5 million copies were printed, but this one was held in reserve for use after serious air raids, and most copies were pulped. A bookshop in Alnwick, Northumberland, found a surviving copy in a box of old books in 2000, framed it by the till, and began selling copies. A slogan that was hardly seen during the war became a modern symbol of British calm.

Chinese tradition has an older version of the ideal. The Records of the Three Kingdoms says of Liu Bei, the founder of the Shu Han state, that he spoke little and was courteous to others, and 喜怒不形于色 (xǐ nù bù xíng yú sè): joy and anger did not show on his face. The phrase became a stock compliment for self-possessed officials. But another classic, the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean), describes the ideal differently: 喜怒哀乐之未发,谓之中;发而皆中节,谓之和. In James Legge’s nineteenth-century English, before pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are stirred the mind is in a state of equilibrium, and when they are stirred and “act in their due degree” there is harmony. That is closer to regulating the strength of a feeling than to hiding it.

Research suggests the culture around you changes how restraint works. In a 2011 study, suppression went with lower life satisfaction and more depressed mood among 71 European American students, but not among 100 Hong Kong Chinese students. Emily Butler, Sherry Lee, and Gross found in 2007 that the social costs of suppression were weaker among people who held more Asian values, whatever their ethnicity. A 2021 meta-analysis of 41 studies found that suppression went with less positive feeling in Western samples (r = −.16) and with essentially none in Eastern ones. The costs were smaller, not gone, and nearly all of this work uses students and questionnaires. Cultures also differ in which feelings they prize: in a 2006 study, European Americans and Asian Americans both valued excitement more than Hong Kong Chinese did, while Hong Kong Chinese and Asian Americans valued calm more than European Americans did. Chinese Americans may know both ideals from the inside.

In Gross’s film experiments, what did hiding a reaction to a disgusting film (suppression) mostly do?

When a low mood loops

Some feelings do not pass. They loop. A person turns over the same question, why do I feel like this, what is wrong with me, why did I say that, and the turning seems to be thinking but does not move anywhere. Psychologists call it rumination. Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, who studied it for decades, found that people who respond to low mood by dwelling on it stay low longer and are more likely to develop depression than people who distract themselves or act. A neat natural experiment came on 17 October 1989, when the Loma Prieta earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay Area at 5:04 in the afternoon, about half an hour before the third game of the World Series. Nolen-Hoeksema and Benita Morrow had questioned 137 university students two weeks earlier. Ten days and seven weeks after the quake they asked again. Students who had a ruminative style, and who dwelt on the quake in the first days, were still more depressed and stressed seven weeks later, even after their earlier mood was taken into account. Women score a little higher than men on rumination in a pooled analysis of 59 studies, but the difference is small.

Nolen-Hoeksema also noted that rumination does not help people solve their problems. It crowds out the actions that might, and it wears down social support. That may be why a low mood so often lifts when you do something. The best-tested form is behavioral activation: planning small, concrete, mildly pleasant or useful activities and doing them even when you do not feel like it. In a 2016 trial in England, 440 adults with depression were treated either with behavioral activation delivered by junior mental-health workers or with cognitive behavioral therapy delivered by psychological therapists. After a year the two groups did equally well. Reviews of exercise find a moderate benefit for depression, but with weak study quality: the large 2023 review of 97 earlier reviews found a median effect size of −0.43, and a 2024 network meta-analysis found walking, jogging, yoga, and strength training all helped, with very low to low certainty because the trials were small and imperfect. A 90-minute walk in a natural setting reduced rumination, and activity in a part of the prefrontal cortex tied to it, in a small 2015 study, while a walk beside a busy road did not.

Doing something that gives you a choice may help for a different reason. In a set of studies on “retail therapy,” people who were made sad and then made purchase decisions, even hypothetical ones, were less sad afterward than people who made no choices, apparently because choosing restores a sense of control. It did not help with anger, it was a laboratory effect, and it says nothing in favor of shopping as a habit. But it fits the pattern: a small action that restores a sense of agency can break the loop.

When your mood is low: what helps?

Sort each approach by what the studies found, then read the note.

  • Planning a few small, concrete activities and doing them, even without the moodBehavioral activation. A 2016 trial of 440 adults found it matched cognitive therapy after a year, even when delivered by junior workers.
  • Going over and over why you feel this way and what it says about youBrooding rumination predicts staying low longer and developing depression. It feels like problem solving but crowds out the actions that would help.
  • Walking, jogging, yoga, or strength training on a regular basisReviews find a moderate benefit, though the trials are small and the certainty is low. It is cheap and low-risk, but it does not replace treatment for severe depression.
  • Putting a name to exactly what you feelA modest effect, mixed across studies. It seems to take a little heat out of a feeling, and costs nothing.
  • Keeping a smile on your face so nobody seesHiding the display does not change the feeling, and in Western samples it costs memory and closeness. Choosing when and with whom to share is different from hiding.
  • Waiting for the mood to “lift on its own,” indoors and alone, for weeksMoods often pass, but low mood that lasts more than about two weeks, or that includes thoughts of self-harm, is a reason to talk to a doctor. In the United States, the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline is available by call or text.

What the brain story gets right, and what it adds

Popular accounts of depression tend to tell it as a brain-circuit story: the amygdala fires, the hippocampus supplies reasons, and a part of the cingulate cortex holds the loop shut. Each part is real, but the neat version goes beyond the evidence. A worldwide consortium scanned about 8,900 people and found that the hippocampus is, on average, about 1 percent smaller in those with a history of depression. That is a small difference, and it was not present in a first episode; the groups overlap almost entirely, so no brain scan can diagnose depression in one person. A stricter pooling of 99 imaging experiments found no region that reliably lit up differently in depression across studies. A region of the cingulate cortex deep beneath the front of the brain looked like a promising target, and in 2005 Helen Mayberg’s team reported that electrical stimulation there lifted the mood of four of six patients with severe depression who had not responded to other treatments. In the large controlled trial that followed, 20 percent of those with active stimulation responded after six months, against 17 percent of those with the device switched off: no meaningful difference. It is a good example of a neat circuit story that did not survive a proper test.

Mood does bias memory. When you are sad, sad memories and failures come to mind more easily, and neutral events look gloomy. This “mood-congruent” memory shows up in many experiments, though not all (in 41 of 66 laboratory experiments in one review). The memories can be real. The selection is what is biased. People with depression also tend to recall their past in general terms rather than as specific episodes, and that habit, too, predicts a somewhat slower recovery. The brain is not inventing reasons so much as fishing in a pond that the mood has stocked.

The chemistry story is the one most often repeated and most often garbled. It is true that about 90 percent of the body’s serotonin is made in the gut, where it helps move food along and regulates platelets, and that it is generally said not to cross into the brain, which makes its own. It is not true that the gut’s serotonin sets your mood. And the idea that depression is caused by a shortage of brain serotonin has not been established: a 2022 review of the evidence, by Joanna Moncrieff and colleagues, found no consistent support for it, which drew sharp replies from other psychiatrists that the theory had never been so simple. What is solid is that antidepressants do work, on average, better than placebo: a 2018 analysis of 522 trials with 116,477 people found that all 21 drugs it covered beat placebo, by a modest margin (an effect size of about 0.3). The “chemical imbalance” story was never proved, and the drugs are not useless. Do not stop a medication without talking to the doctor who prescribed it.

Another view

One evolutionary account says low mood is not only a malfunction. Paul Andrews and J. Anderson Thomson proposed in 2009 that depression may be an old response to hard, complex problems, which holds attention on the problem and cuts the pull of distractions. It is a hypothesis, and critics say rumination does not in fact improve problem solving. A related popular idea is that a low mood is a kind of alarm, and that small habits such as tidying, shopping, or a game of basketball quiet the brain’s alarm system. The evidence does not show that those particular activities “quiet the amygdala.” It supports something smaller and more practical: absorbing, physical, mildly pleasant activity can lift mood and weaken rumination, whatever the circuitry.

What to keep

  • A racing heart does not label itself. How you read the body’s signals shapes the feeling, but the famous experiments behind that idea (the vitamin shot, the swaying bridge) were weaker than the textbooks say.
  • Naming a feeling takes a little heat out of it. Hiding it does not: suppression cuts the display, not the feeling, and in Western samples costs memory and closeness.
  • Reappraisal, reading arousal as readiness, helps in studies, especially when feeling is mild. No strategy works everywhere; flexibility matters more than any one rule, and culture changes the costs of restraint.
  • A low mood that loops responds better to action than to analysis. The brain-circuit and chemical-imbalance stories are simpler than the evidence, and antidepressants and behavioral activation both help.

Think it over

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Sources and further reading

  • Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, “Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state,” Psychological Review 69 (1962); Rainer Reisenzein, “The Schachter theory of emotion: two decades later,” Psychological Bulletin 94 (1983); Gary Marshall and Philip Zimbardo, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979); Christina Maslach, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979).
  • Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron, “Some evidence for heightened sexual attraction under conditions of high anxiety,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30 (1974); Cindy Meston and Penny Frohlich, “Love at first fright,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 32 (2003).
  • Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017; Kristen Lindquist and colleagues, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (2012); Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues, “Emotional expressions reconsidered,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 20 (2019).
  • Matthew Lieberman and colleagues, “Putting feelings into words,” Psychological Science 18 (2007); Katharina Kircanski, Matthew Lieberman, and Michelle Craske, Psychological Science 23 (2012).
  • James Gross, “The emerging field of emotion regulation: an integrative review,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998); James Gross and Robert Levenson, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64 (1993); Jane Richards and James Gross, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (2000); Emily Butler and colleagues, Emotion 3 (2003); Kevin Ochsner and colleagues, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (2002); Thomas Webb, Eleanor Miles, and Paschal Sheeran, Psychological Bulletin 138 (2012).
  • Jeremy Jamieson and colleagues, “Turning the knots in your stomach into bows,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010); Alison Wood Brooks, “Get excited: reappraising pre-performance anxiety as excitement,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143 (2014).
  • Gal Sheppes and colleagues, Psychological Science 22 (2011); Allison Troy, Amanda Shallcross, and Iris Mauss, Psychological Science 24 (2013); George Bonanno and Charles Burton, “Regulatory flexibility,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (2013).
  • Emily Butler, Sherry Lee, and James Gross, Emotion 7 (2007); Jose Soto and colleagues, Emotion 11 (2011); Jeanne Tsai, Brian Knutson, and Helene Fung, “Cultural variation in affect valuation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90 (2006).
  • Sanguozhi (Chen Shou), “Shu shu,” biography of the First Lord (Liu Bei); Zhongyong, chapter 1, in James Legge’s The Chinese Classics, volume 1.
  • Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and Benita Morrow, “A prospective study of depression and posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991); Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Blair Wisco, and Sonja Lyubomirsky, “Rethinking rumination,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (2008).
  • David Richards and colleagues, “Cost and outcome of behavioural activation versus cognitive behaviour therapy for depression (COBRA),” The Lancet 388 (2016); Ben Singh and colleagues, British Journal of Sports Medicine 57 (2023); Michael Noetel and colleagues, BMJ 384 (2024); Gregory Bratman and colleagues, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (2015); Scott Rick, Beatriz Pereira, and Katherine Burson, Journal of Consumer Psychology 24 (2014).
  • Lianne Schmaal and colleagues (ENIGMA), Molecular Psychiatry 21 (2016); Helen Mayberg and colleagues, Neuron 45 (2005); Paul Holtzheimer and colleagues, The Lancet Psychiatry 4 (2017); Joanna Moncrieff and colleagues, Molecular Psychiatry 28 (2023); Andrea Cipriani and colleagues, The Lancet 391 (2018); Paul Andrews and J. Anderson Thomson, Psychological Review 116 (2009).